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There are a multitude of factors, both internal and external, that may affect the development 
and success of any transport project. ‘Success’ is both context-dependent and quite difficult to 
measure. This paper distinguishes between four types of ‘success’ variables: (lack of) cost 
overruns; (lack of) time delays; (ex-post) level of traffic; and (generated) revenues. Each 
variable is modeled in a binary way (using discrete choice models), with each model 
estimating the relevance of various explanatory factors on the probability of success. Internal 
factors are found to have the greatest effect on that probability, and PPP projects seem to be 
prone to budget overruns and delays. Governance factors, such as the tender process, 
renegotiations, and issues related to penalties, among others, can all produce complications. 
Since the public authority has control over most of these variables, these results could be used 
to improve the ‘success’ of these projects. 
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1. Introduction 
Luck or wisdom? What determines the success or failure of a public-private partnership (PPP) 
project in the transport sector? After exhaustively examining a large dataset of road, rail, air 
and maritime projects, the BENEFIT project5 has concluded that a myriad of causes, both 
internal and external, may affect the development and success of any project, but also that 
these causes may be identified and analysed. 
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In general, any PPP agreement raises a number of economic issues, which not only include the 
question of when PPPs are preferred to other mechanisms (such as traditional procurement) 
but also relate to its various dimensions such as the efficiency of the tender, the contracting 
environment, the impact of renegotiation, and funding and financing options. In most cases all 
these issues ultimately boil down to one key question: what is the relationship between the two 
parties involved in the development of the project – the private sector and the public 
administration – and how might their divergent interests and procedures converge to a 
common end? 
During the 1980s and 1990s, PPPs were predominantly employed as an alternative approach to 
fund infrastructure when governments lacked the resources to tackle large or medium size 
projects. Although this mechanism had occasionally been used in previous projects, its use has 
expanded in recent years as PPPs have increasingly been considered to increase the success of 
a project by sharing the risk between the private and the public parties and by connecting the 
remuneration (of the private partner) to specific performance goals (Ng & Loosemore, 2007). 
Nonetheless, this type of partnership has proved far from being a panacea or a 100% recipe for 
success. In fact, many PPPs are prone to renegotiation as in any other kind of project, 
particularly in the transport sector (Domingues & Miranda, 2016), and rely heavily on critical 
factors for success (such as a reliable revenue stream as pointed out by Grimsey & Lewis, 
2002). 
As mentioned above, the tendering procedure, economic planning and/or the economic 
context (Galilea & Medda, 2010) are just some of the issues that may jeopardize or improve the 
prospects of a project. The advantage of the two first factors is that they can be pre- established 
by the parties, although this does not necessary imply perfect control over them throughout 
the project. For instance, the degree of project debt financing may become unbearable because 
of an unanticipated change in demand that erodes revenues and reverses the, a priori, good 
economic planning. In many cases, bad performance leads to the parties having to renegotiate 
and thus, in increased costs and delays. The economic context, on the other hand, is governed 
by forces that are exogenous to the project, and that increase overall uncertainty. This paper 
aims to define the extent to which these causes, plus others, explain project success. However, 
even when these causes have been identified, it is difficult to measure them. To progress 
towards this aim, this paper employs indicators that seek to build upon previous academic 
findings and insights (Vanesslander et al, 2015; Voordijk et al, 2015; Pantelias et al, 2015; 
Roumboutsos et al, 2016; and Mladenovic et al, 2016). 
On the other hand, the definition of ‘project success’ itself is also a continuing matter of debate 
in the field. Jugdev and Müller, for example, said: “success is an interesting word. The word 
connotes different things to different people and is very context-dependent” (Jugdev and Müller, 2005, 
page 19). Oisen (1971) had previously specified success as being related to cost, time and 
quality, the so-called “iron triangle”; although these have since evolved to include a wider 
range of criteria such as those of Shenhar et al. (2001). Nevertheless, even when there is 
agreement over specific success criteria, the way to measure them is far from clear, and 
greatly affected by the context. In this study, the following four measurement criteria for 
success have been selected: cost and time underruns (lack of cost and time overruns); and 
revenue and traffic achieved ex-post in relation to forecast values. The first two provide 
information during the construction process, while the latter two furnish data about success 
when the transport project is completed. Their values have been approached in a binary way so 
as to model them in a probabilistic framework; making use of discrete choice models. 
 
5 BENEFIT is the acronym of Business Models for enhancing Funding and enabling Financing for 
Infrastructure in Transport, a European research project within the Horizon 2020 framework, which has 
studied between 2015-2017 the characteristics and results of the PPP transport projects in Europe. For details, 
see www.benefit4transport.eu 
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Specifically, current state-of-the-art analysis of PPP projects – even though they have 
developed strongly in both theoretical and practical case studies - lacks this kind of 
methodological approach. The dataset includes 56 transport cases, of which 41 are PPPs and 15 
purely public projects. 
 
2. Literature review 
Success criteria differ among authors and are very context-dependent. As a first approach, iron 
triangle has been challenged, adapted and enriched over the years.6 For instance, Shenhar and 
Dvir (2007) opt for a diamond approach rather than a triangle, to provide a more reliable 
assessment of risk and benefits and avoid potential gaps. Additionally, multilateral 
organizations, like the World Bank, stress the importance of the institutional framework 
(Amos, 2004). 
The main empirical approach to project success in the literature – index numbers aside – has 
been to focus on cost and time (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003 and 2004; Sweis et al, 2008; or Assaf and Al-
Hejji, 2006). Both variables can provide a reasonable approach in the short term when the 
project is being carried out, but lose their utility in the longer run. 
Once the infrastructure is available, new criteria are needed. A project can be considered a 
success in terms of cost and time in the first phase, but falter in the long term because of lack of 
a demand, as highlighted by Shenhar and Dvir (2007) with the example of the Los Angeles 
Metro. In this sense, Lim and Mohamned (1999) distinguish between the micro and the macro 
point of view to stress the necessary distinction between the short term (completion) and the 
long term (more oriented towards customer satisfaction). 
Another issue is that of the potential relationship among these variables. Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) 
checked that delayed projects are prone to increasing costs. This relationship was also found 
and analysed in other studies about the causes of time overruns in the construction industry 
(Memon et al, 2011). Torp et al. (2016), specifically study this relationship between cost and 
time delays by drawing on evidence from Norwegian construction projects. 
The way in which these explanatory variables are analysed takes different forms. Mir and 
Pinnington (2014), use bivariate correlation and multiple regression tests to study the 
importance of different variables that contribute to project success. Osei-kyei and Chan (2015) 
review studies on the critical success factors for PPP projects and conclude that the most 
widely used approach is the case study. Domingues and Miranda (2016) use probit models to 
identify the main factors that explain the renegotiation of PPP projects. 
This research follows a path that is in line with previous studies undertaken in this field where 
‘success’ indicators along with ‘success factors’ have been explicitly defined. Our major 
contribution lies in scrutinizing the relationship among these variables using a bivariate probit 
model based on a large and non-previously exploited dataset. 
 
3. Dataset 
The dataset comprises 56 transport cases, of which 41 are PPPs and 15 public projects. 
Practically all these cases were obtained from the COST Action TU1001 (Roumboutsos et al, 
2013; 2014) and the Omega Center Megaproject, which in turn were taken from 19 European 
and four non-European countries covering all means of transport. 
 
6 Chronologically, see for example: Pinto & Slevin (1988), Pinto & Prescott (1988), Atkinson (1999), Andersen et 
al. (2006), Brown, Adams & Amjad (2007), Chow and Ng (2007), Kolltveit et al (2007), Shenhar and Dvir (2007), 
Mir and Pinnington (2013), Ferrari et al. (2015) or Joslin and Müller (2016). 
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The dataset comprises 56 transport cases, of which 41 are PPPs and 15 public projects. 
Practically all these cases were obtained from the COST Action TU1001 (Roumboutsos et al, 
2013; 2014) and the Omega Center Megaproject, which in turn were taken from 19 European and 
four non-European countries covering all means of transport. They comprise four airports, 26 
roads, eight seaports, nine trams/metros, three rail, one terminal freight, four bridges/tunnels 
and one bicycle station. 
The development of all 56 cases has been further decomposed into discrete intermediate stages 
(or ‘snapshots’) to provide more detailed data about their evolution. Nevertheless, the number of 
snapshots varies with each project, depending on the availability of information. The sum of 
these snapshots means that the dataset comprises 183 observations. The monitoring of each 
project has been carried out through the application of indicators. These indicators have been 
validated and revised by Vanesslander et al. (2015), Voordijk et al. (2015), Pantelias et al. (2015), 
Roumboutsos et al. (2016) and Mladenovic et al. (2016). The indicators are: financial-
macroeconomic context; an availability and reliability index (IRA); cost savings; revenue 
support; governance; remuneration attractiveness; revenue robustness; market efficiency; and 
financing indicator; each of these are explained in detail in Appendix A. 
 
4. The model 
 
The aim of this study is to provide some empirical evidence regarding the factors that explain the 
“success” of a transport infrastructure project. Such ‘success’ is empirically approached by four 
variables: cost underruns (lack of cost overruns); time underruns (lack of time delays); actual 
versus forecast traffic, and actual versus forecast revenues. Note that cost and time variables are 
more focused on the short term (when the infrastructure building is still in progress), whereas 
traffic and revenue variables are more oriented towards the long term (when the infrastructure is 
already available for the users). However, the distinction between short and long term to 
contextualize the variables is blurred. Most infrastructure projects evolve at different stages; in 
which some phases become available while the rest remains in progress. During this process, 
some phases may, or not, incur budget overruns or delays. At the same time, as soon as certain 
phases become available, the project can generate demand/traffic and revenues which may, or 
not, exceed the traffic or the revenue forecast. The inclusion of ‘snapshots’ (intermediate stages) 
also helps to capture these different developments.  
 
On the other hand, while the inclusion of variables such as cost overrun, or time overrun can be 
addressed easily, ‘actual versus forecast traffic’ and ‘actual versus forecast revenue’ are more 
qualitative and need to be analysed with caution. For instance, the revenue or level of traffic may 
not meet expectations; however, this does not necessarily imply that the project is a ‘failure’, but 
simply that expectations have not been met. 
 
The endogenous variables take discrete values (binary outcomes), which involve the use of 
binary outcome models (micro econometric models). Finally, both pairs of variables (cost and 
time underruns; and revenue and traffic forecast) will be tackled simultaneously assuming 
correlation between them through the error term (equation (1)). This assumption involves the use 
of a bivariate probit model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). A bivariate probit has the following 
functional form (equation 1): 
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:                            (1) 
Where sub index i  denotes cases, iy  and iq  are the endogenous variables, ijX  represents the 
variable/factor j  per case i , j  and j  the parameter estimated by the model; and iu and ie are 
the error terms that are assumed correlated (  ). The explanatory variables are those mentioned 
in the dataset: Financial-macroeconomic context; IRA; cost savings; revenue support; governance 
indicator; remuneration attractiveness; revenue robustness; market efficiency; and financing 
indicator. Finally, two dummy variables for PPP projects and the economic crisis have also been 
included. The former takes value 1 if the project is PPP, and zero in other cases. The latter takes 
value 1 if the project started in 2008 or later, and zero in other cases.  
 
The discrete values of the four endogenous variables are as follows: 
1  if cost is below budget or on budget (i.e. lack of cost overruns)
0 if cost is over budget (i.e. cost overruns) 
1  if time is ahead of schedule or on time (i.e. lack of 
 
cost underrun
time underrun



time delays) 
0 if time is delayed



 
1  if revenue is exceeding forecast or as forecasted 
 
0 if revenue is below or far below forecasted
1  if traffic is exceeding forecast or as forecasted 
   
0 if traffic
revenue forecast
traffic forecast



 is below forecasted



 
 
Alternatively, if the number of snapshots had been more balanced by cases, panel data models 
may have been applied. The highly unbalanced structure of the dataset implies that pool 
regressions provide more reliable results. (Wooldridge, 2002; Baltagi, 2005; and Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2009). 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 show the estimates of the four bivariate models (cost and time underrun; and 
revenue and traffic forecast, respectively). Both internal and external factors matter to explain 
project success. Variables such as financial economic setting, governance, cost savings, and revenue 
support have a significant effect on the cost underrun equation whereas, in the time underrun 
equation, the significant variables are: PPP, crisis, financial-macroeconomic context, IRA, governance, 
remuneration attractiveness, and revenue robustness. Similar reasoning can be undertaken regarding 
the revenue and traffic forecast model. In the revenue equation, PPP, crisis, IRA, revenue 
robustness, and financing scheme show a significant and positive effect. Whereas, in the traffic 
equation, the financial-macroeconomic context, IRA, cost savings, remuneration attractiveness and 
revenue robustness are the variables that better explain project performance. 
 
The parameter “athrho” is the estimate of  . It is positive and significant in both models, which 
implies that both endogenous variables are positively and significantly correlated. The estimates 
of the models in Tables 1 and 2 show the linear change in utility but not in probability. The 
elasticities shown in Tables 3 and 4 provide the percentage change in the probability of success 
given a one percent change in the explanatory variables. 
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  Table 1. Cost and time underrun estimation (bivariate model). 
 
                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0. 
  
 Log pseudo 
likelihood 
= -112.011 
Observations 
124 
  Wald Chi2(22)= 66.18 
  Prob Chi2=0.0001 
  
 Coefficients Robust Std. Error 
Cost underrun:   
PPP -0.392 0.450 
Crisis -0.083 0.333 
Financial-macroeconomic 
context 
3.11** 1.354 
ARI 2.838 0.945 
Governance 2.263** 0.980 
Cost savings 1.431** 0.669 
Revenue support 5.567*** 1.561 
Remuneration attractiveness 0.034 0.426 
Revenue robustness 0.349 0.426 
Market efficiency -0.011 0.726 
Financing scheme 0.204 0.742 
Constant -4.410*** 1.618 
   
Time underrun:   
PPP -0.862** 0.418 
Crisis -0.971*** 0.318 
Financial-macroeconomic 
context 
2.092* 1.185 
ARI 2.786*** 0.977 
Governance 5.368*** 1.181 
Cost savings -0.386 0.596 
Revenue support 1.400 1.658 
Remuneration attractiveness -1.293** 0.593 
Revenue robustness -0.995** 0.503 
Market efficiency -0.038 0.719 
Financing scheme -0.662 0.725 
Constant -3.756*** 1.485 
athrho 0.887*** 0.231 
rho 0.710 0.114 
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   Table 2.  Revenue and traffic estimation (bivariate model). 
 Log pseudo 
likelihood 
= -89.792 
Observations 
128 
  Wald Chi2(20)= 91.35 
  Prob Chi2=0.000 
  
 Coefficients Robust Std. Error 
Revenue forecast:   
PPP -1.022** 0.509 
Crisis -0.895** 0.460 
Financial-macroeconomic 
context 
1.411 1.365 
ARI 2.245** 0.963 
Governance 1.000 1.014 
Cost savings 0.503 0.615 
Revenue support 4.826*** 1.711 
Remuneration attractiveness 0.900 0.627 
Revenue robustness 1.762*** 0.695 
Market efficiency -0.549 0.668 
Financing scheme -2.187** 0.914 
Constant -1.497 1.836 
   
Traffic forecast:   
PPP -0.309 0.429 
Crisis -0.462 0.323 
Financial-macroeconomic 
context 
3.854*** 1.291 
ARI 2.022*** 0.965 
Governance 0.884 1.122 
Cost savings 1.092* 0.668 
Revenue support 4.477*** 1.629 
Remuneration attractiveness 1.878*** 0.614 
Revenue robustness 0.818* 0.501 
Market efficiency -1.594*** 0.663 
Financing scheme 0.205 0.747 
Constant -5.863*** 1.585 
   
athrho 16.029*** 1.533 
rho 1 7.36e-14 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Table 3 shows the elasticities of the probability of the cost and time underrun model. PPPs reduce 
the possibility of finishing a project successfully (either below budget or on budget and ahead of 
schedule or on time) by 0.35% respect to both public projects and the concession of operation 
projects. On the other hand, the economic crisis, an external factor, negatively affects the success of 
the project. Specifically, projects undertaken during the crisis years were 0.34% less likely to 
finish successfully. Another external factor is the financial-macroeconomic context (macroeconomic 
environment and financial market development): this variable has a positive effect on the 
probability. A 1% increase in this variable increases the probability of finishing the project 
successfully by 1.014%.  
 
On the other hand, internal factors such as IRA or governance provide the greatest change in the 
probability of success. Thus, a 1% increase in them increases the probability of success by 1.23% 
and 1.85%, respectively. In other words, improvements in the reliability and the availability of the 
infrastructure, as well as in the contractual conditions, increase the probability of success in term 
of cost and time. This variable is particularly relevant because it shows the highest effect on the 
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probability and because the public authority can have greater control over it. Finally, the last 
significant variable in the model is revenue support where a 1% improvement means an increase 
in the probability of success of about 0.41% (i.e. those projects that better generate revenues and 
exploit potential sources of revenue, increase their probabilities (by 0.41%) of finishing the project 
successfully in term of cost and time. 
 
Table 4 highlights the results regarding elasticity in the revenue and traffic forecast model. 
Firstly, neither PPP projects nor the economic crisis affect the probability of both revenue and 
traffic forecast. On the other hand, an increase in 1% in the financial-macroeconomic context 
improves the probability of success by about 1.24%. In relation to the internal factors, the 
followings variables increase the probability of success in terms of revenue and traffic: IRA, the 
capacity to keep costs under control (cost savings), the ability of the project to generate revenues 
and exploit its potential sources of revenue (revenue support), and both the income and the 
revenue streams weighted against their risks (remuneration attractiveness and revenue 
robustness). A 1% increase in these factors are associated with a 1.08%, 0.21%, 0.49%, 0.54% and 
0.26% increase in the probability of matching the revenues and the traffic forecast, respectively. 
Finally, the political attractiveness of the project funding scheme (market efficiency) leads to a 
decrease in the probability of matching the revenues and the traffic forecast by about 0.35%. 
 
Table 3. Elasticities of cost and time underrun.  
 ey/ex Robust Std. Error 
PPP -0.352* 0.200 
Crisis -0.347** 0.156 
Financial-macroeconomic 
context 
1.014** 0.472 
IRA 1.232** 0.544 
Governance 1.851*** 0.461 
Cost savings 0.076 0.132 
Revenue support 0.414** 0.197 
Remuneration 
attractiveness 
-0.287 0.184 
Revenue robustness -0.196 0.152 
Market efficiency -0.007 0.152 
Financing scheme -0.181 0.349 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
 
 
Table 4. Elasticities of the revenue and the traffic forecast. 
 ey/ex Robust Std. Error 
PPP -0.126 0.177 
Crisis -0.202 0.144 
Financial-macroeconomic 
context 
1.248*** 0.432 
IRA 1.084** 0.545 
Governance 0.311 0.405 
Cost savings 0.211* 0.125 
Revenue support 0.491*** 0.176 
Remuneration 
attractiveness 
0.547*** 0.179 
Revenue robustness 0.267* 0.163 
Market efficiency -0.354*** 0.152 
Financing scheme 0.090 0.327 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this study has been to provide some empirical evidence regarding the factors that 
explain the ‘success’ of a transport infrastructure project. Our first conclusion, from a technical 
viewpoint, is that a case study dataset – in particular, the one generated from the BENEFIT EU 
research project (see www.benefit4transport.eu)  – can be used to find and measure common 
factors regarding the development and results of these transport projects. In fact, by expanding 
the information using intermediate stages or ‘snapshots’, we have been able to apply a bivariate 
probit model to obtain reliable estimates of the qualitative relationship among explanatory 
variables. 
Secondly, both internal and external factors explain the probability of success both in term of cost 
and time; as well as in terms of revenue and traffic forecast. However, internal factors seem to 
provide the greatest effect on the probability of success so that, for example, while an unexpected 
economic shock may adversely affect the project funding, and thus, its success, managers and 
policymaker’s may work upon these variables to overcome the external negative effect and keep 
the project on track.  
 
For instance, when focusing on the time lapse between the moment the project is awarded and 
the period when the infrastructure has not yet been finished, most attention should be oriented 
towards monitoring the following factors: PPP; IRA; governance; and revenue support. These 
variables are associated with the public-private partnership, the reliability and availability of the 
infrastructure, the contractual conditions (number of bidders, bonding requirements, clauses 
enabling the service to be updated and/or price changes, among others) and the capacity to 
generate revenues and potential sources of revenue within the projects, respectively.  
 
On the other hand, in the long term: IRA; cost savings; revenue support; remuneration attractiveness; 
and revenue robustness offer the greatest effect on the probability of success in term of revenue and 
traffic. These variables are associated with the reliability and availability of the infrastructure, the 
capacity to keep costs under control, exploit the project’s potential sources of revenue; and its 
income and revenue streams, weighted by their respective risks. 
 
Thus, policymakers should improve the incentives mechanism related to cost and time aspects so 
as to bend the propensity of PPPs to incur in budget issues and delays. In this sense, aspects 
relating to governance can play a relevant role toward this aim. In sum, the public authority has a 
great degree of control over all aspects related to governance - such as: the tender process; any 
renegotiation; the encouraging of competition between bidders; increasing penalties in case of 
delays or cost overrun; and monitoring and controlling the expected cost of the project – and they 
should make greater use of this power to increase the success rate of PPP projects.     
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Appendix A 
 
The variables can be defined in the following way: 
the macroeconomic and financial context indicator is based on international indices and it measures 
the business environment or the capacity to achieve sustained economic growth. Specifically, it 
comprises two elements: growth; and macroeconomics and financial terms. The World 
Economic Forum provides information about the former which is publicly available: the so-
called ‘global competitiveness index’. This index aims to evaluate the capacity of a country to 
achieve sustained economic growth. The second is based on both macroeconomic and financial 
indicators such as inflation, general government final consumption expenditure, GDP per capita 
growth, the unemployment rate, Standard & Poor’s global equity prices and domestic credit to 
the private sector.  
IRA measures the reliability (% time of disruptions during operation) and availability (% time of 
availability of the transport infrastructure or the days in a year that the infrastructure is 
available to the users). Both reliability and availability take value 0, 0.5 or 1; 0 being not 
reliable/available and 1 fully reliable/available. Algebraically, the composite indicator is: 
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 (1 )(1 )
4
Reliability Availability
IRA
 
  
Cost savings is based on several indicators that seek to measure the efficiency of the projects to 
keep costs under control in terms of construction and operation. The cost-saving function is 
comprised of the following two sub-functions: the construction cost and the 
operation/maintenance cost; which, at the same time, are built on the following group of 
variables. Regarding the construction cost sub-function:  
level of civil works ( 1x ),  
capability to construct ( 2x ),  
capability of the Contracting Authority to monitor construction (
2cax ), 
level of optimal construction risk allocation ( 3x ),  
adoption of innovation ( 4x ),  
capability to innovate ( 5x ), and  
capability of the Contracting Authority to plan ( 1cax ).  
The capability of the Contracting Authority to monitor construction (
2cax ) seeks to answer 
questions related to re-negotiations during the project implementation period, stakeholders’ 
support of the project or the good project management record of the public authority. In the case 
of the capability of the Contracting Authority to plan ( 1cax ), this variable focuses on the political 
decision to adopt a PPP or public procurement or the development of studies about the 
feasibility of the project, among other aspects. 
On the other hand, regarding the operation/maintenance cost, the variables are: 
life cycle planning ( 6x ),  
capability to operate ( 7x ), 
level of optimal operation risk allocation ( 8x ), and  
capability of the Contracting Authority to operate (
3cax ). The latter address issues such as the 
experience of the public authority to operate the specific infrastructure. 
All these variables take value 1 if the answer is positive or 0 otherwise. Algebraically, the cost 
saving element can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑆 = 𝑥2𝑥3𝑥𝑐𝑎2 − (𝑥1 − 𝑥1𝑥2𝑥3) + 𝑥4𝑥5𝑥𝑐𝑎1 − 𝑥6𝑥7𝑥8𝑥𝑐𝑎3 
 
during the construction phase and  𝐶𝑆 = 𝑥6𝑥7𝑥8𝑥𝑐𝑎3 − 𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑅 during the operation phase; where 
CORx represents the cost overrun of the construction phase in percent (%). If CS=0, not cost 
saving is observed. On the other hand, if CS<0, cost overruns may be observed. 
Revenue support is also a composite indicator that tries to approach the ability of the project to 
generate revenues and exploit its potential sources of revenues. As in the case of the cost saving, 
it is composed of sub-functions with their respective variables:  
the level of competition for greenfield projects ( 11x ) and brownfield projects ( 16x ) which refer to 
the position of the infrastructure in the transport network or the degree of ‘exclusivity’. 
Revenues from the greenfield part of the project as: share of greenfield ( 10x ), capability to 
manage traffic demand ( 12x ), level of optimal risk allocation demand ( 13x ), satisfaction level (
14x ), 
Revenues from the brownfield part of the project: share of brownfield ( 15x ), capability to 
manage traffic demand ( 17x ), level of optimal risk allocation demand ( 18x ), satisfaction level (
14x ), 
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Revenues from other transport activities from within the project or even from different transport 
projects (cross-subsidization): Share of other transport projects (
16x ), capability to manage traffic 
demand (
17x ), level of optimal demand risk allocation demand ( 18x ), satisfaction level ( 14x ), 
Revenues from other non-transport activities from within the project or other non-transport 
projects: share of non-transport activities (x 
Other wider impacts (positives or negatives) such as economic, environmental, social, or 
institutional). 
The variables associated to ‘revenue support’ take values from 0% to 100%; being 0% not 
addressed or included by the project and 100% fully addressed or not included by the project. 
The sub-functions are combined in the following manner to yield the ‘revenue support’: 
  
11 16 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 16 12 13 14 20 21 22
( )RS x x sb x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x      ; 
being sb the share of brownfield.  
Governance is comprised of two dimensions: efficiency/effectiveness and contractual flexibility. 
Those interested in the indicator are referred to Clarke (2004, 2007) and Mallin (2004, 2006), 
among others. This indicator focuses on transactions, but not on stakeholders’ issues. According 
to Li et al (2012), it helps to reduce transaction cost. Briefly, the development of this indicator 
implies the following dimensions:  
Efficiency/effectiveness of governance: 
The client selected only one service provider [bidder] to participate in the pricing stage (
1G ). 
The client and the key service providers [bidders] collectively estimated the expected project 
cost ( 2G ). 
Encouragement of competition between bidders ( 3G ). 
Integration of design and construction ( 4G ). 
The key service providers [contractor] paid a penalty if completion dates were not met ( 5G ). 
The key service providers [contractor] solely carried the risk of rising costs ( 6G ). 
The client and key service providers [contractor] [to share] shared equal proportions of profit 
due to cost underruns ( 7G ). 
Bonding requirements ( 8G ). 
All exploitation, commercial/revenue & financial risks are shared ( 9G ). 
Contractual flexibility: 
Clauses enable both updating of service and price changes ( 10G ). 
Clauses indicate that client has an option to terminate the agreement without cause ( 11G ). 
1G , 2G , 5G  and 6G  take value 0, 0.5 or 1 being 0 ‘negative response’ and 1 ‘totally affirmative 
response’. The other variables take value 0 (negative response) or 1 (affirmative response).  
Algebraically, the overall governance indicator is: 
1
n
i
i
G
GI
n


 
Remuneration attractiveness (RA) reflects the attractiveness of the remuneration scheme for 
investors. It is composed of ‘cost recovery’ (CR) (income streams) and ‘risk of income’ (RI). The 
former can be defined as the share of coverage of project costs assured by the funding scheme 
(%). The latter is the sum of the product of the share (%) of income/s on total revenues (include 
multiple source of income) and the risk of the income/s source/s. That is, 
1 1
h w
i j
i j
RI a b
 
   
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being ia the share of  the 
thi  income on total revenues and jb the risk of the 
thj  source of risk of 
the income streams. Finally, the RA indicator is: RA=RA*W if CR >0, where W represents the 
weight of RI in the remuneration. 
 
Revenue robustness’ (RR) is identical to the RA indicator. The main difference between both 
indicators is semantic. Revenues refer to those incomes generated by the projects (subsidies are 
not included) while remuneration refers to the stream of incomes received by the project 
manager. Algebraically, the formula is equal to the RA indicator. Thus, this indicator is formed 
by ‘cost recovery’ and ‘risk of revenues’ instead of ‘risk of income’.  
 
Market efficiency’ (ME) is a composite indicator that reflects the political attractiveness of the 
project funding scheme from the perspectives of the efficiency of utilization of the transport 
infrastructure and the acceptability of the funding scheme for voters. More precisely, this 
indicator includes the following dimensions: 
Adherence of the infrastructure usage of pricing scheme to (social) marginal cost of 
infrastructure use (
1smc ). Two key questions are: does the pricing scheme reflect scarcity 
(airports and ports) or congestion (roads and railways)? Does the pricing scheme reflect the 
internalization of the environmental impact and infrastructure costs? This is scaled from 1 to 4; 
being 1 not related and 4 fully related.    
Application of consistent marginal cost pricing scheme in competitive infrastructure ( 2smc ). 
This involves analyzing any change in the pricing when there is similar infrastructure available. 
This dimension takes value 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise. 
The formula for the ‘market efficiency’ indicator is: 1M E sm c  if 2smc >0 
The Financing indicator (FI) reflects an expanded version of the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) of the project that is able to consider financing contributions from both public and 
private sources. The mathematical form of the indicator is: 
 
𝐹𝑆 = 1 − 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 and  𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝐾𝐸
𝐸
𝐸+𝐷+𝐺
+ 𝐾𝐷
𝐷
𝐸+𝐷+𝐺
+ 𝐾𝐺
𝐺
𝐸+𝐷+𝐺
 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 is the WACC (Brealey et al, 2011) of the project but adjusted by the theoretical cost 
of funds assigned to the different sources of equity and debt 
 
(𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 =
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑍
 , 𝑍 ∈ ℤ+). 
 
EK  represents the cost of the equity of the project. If the data is available, the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) is used for the estimation. In case of missing data, theoretical values are 
used as the source of this equity contribution. 
DK  is the cost of debt of the project. Information about loan interest rate or bond coupons are 
used to approach this cost. Theoretical values are used in the absence of such information. 
GK  is the cost of public sector funds of the project.  
 E  is the equity financing contribution (in monetary value or share %) to the project. 
 D is the debt financing contribution (in monetary value or share %) to the project. 
G  is the public sector financing contribution (in monetary value or share %) to the project. 
z  is the range of the theoretical scale that has been used to price the cost of funds for the 
various sources of equity and debt. In general, is assumed to be a positive integer number (in 
this case). 
